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In undertaking a comparative study of countless myths 
and religious Mircea Eliade concluded that each culture 
establishes an axis that orients its beliefs and guarantees 
its values, and that that ideal axis is supposed to take ma-
terial form (as tree, liana, pillar, ladder, etc.) and marks 
the navel of the world, the centre of the cosmos 1 . The axis 
mundi traces a vertical line that rises to the loftiest heights 
of the sky and descends to the most inaccessible depths 
of the earth and ensures the unity of all elements of the 
cosmos or, in literary terms, the cohesion of the machina 
mundi, the machine of the world, affirming it and centring 
it at the midpoint of inhabited space.
This point, this omphalos or navel of the world, was rep-
resented materially by the Greeks of ancient and classical 
times. Some situated it on the isle of Delos, where Apollo 
was born; others thought it to be located at Delphi, where 
we can still see it, at the place where Apollo slew the ser-
pent Python and stole its divinatory gifts. Around the om-
phalos, the site at which the axis of the world intercepts the 
earth, a cosmos is built, an organised field of space and time 
subtracted from chaos by the edifying power of culture.
All distinctions between belonging and not belonging, be-
tween us and them, normal and not normal, are established 
with reference to this ordering of space (indicated by the 
border) and time (allocated by the calendar), in defiance 
of the disintegrating forces of chaos, who, for the ancient 
Greeks, was a powerful god – perhaps the most powerful, 
to whom everything returned – whose name was written 
with a capital letter and whose presence was to be vener-
ated as much as that of Zeus and the Moirai, or Fates. 
If a citizen of the polis set off on a journey, as he travelled 
away from the centre he would find, immediately after the 
hellene (the Greeks), the barbaroi (barbarians), and after 
them, savages. Pursuing his course away from the centre, 
he would pass into the domain of monsters, which them-
selves became ever more hideous and distant from the hu-
man standard. As his storm-tossed fleet sailed further from 
Greece, Ulysses encountered in succession the Lotopha-
gi, or lotus-eaters, who were still human in appearance, 
the Laestrygonians, who were man-eating giants, and the 
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Cyclopes (like the Odyssey’s Polyphemus), who retained 
basic traces of the human but reflected a teratology of hu-
manity. At the limit, he met the Phorcides, disjointed mon-
sters who shared a single eye.
Thus, between the axis mundi and chaos, the exemplary 
normality of the centre became gradually more diluted and 
fragmented, and the further one travelled along this path, 
the more the earth’s inhabitants became denatured and de-
humanised – and let us not forget that the sophist Protago-
ras, tutelary founder of anthropology, declared that “man 
is the measure of all things”. Extreme monsters indicated 
a threatening domain, a space in which intrusion signified 
transgression and risk. At the limit, a Greek explorer de-
termined to challenge all prudence and go beyond all the 
spheres would find chaos, and tumble into the abyss. 
The whole of this itinerary forms a gradient, and while the 
normal pattern is identified with the norms of the group 
throughout the journey, the non-normal assumes diverse 
and increasingly frightening configurations. Moreover, 
the visible changes in morphological appearance had an 
equivalent in the inner lives of these conjectural beings that 
inhabited the imagination of the Greeks of ancient times: 
enormity, deformity and ugliness were related to wicked 
thoughts, violence, sub-human temperament and animal 
impulses. Conversely, the works of Plato and the Greek 
sculptors of the classical period sought to express the good, 
the beautiful, the just, the heroic and the worthy. 
For the purposes of effective administration of justice, 
Roman doctors recognised different groups of abnormal 
persons: the fatui, the mentecapti and the furiosi. Mean-
while, ever since Aristotle’s successor Theophrastus, the 
science of the western world has distinguished and codi-
fied various types of human character. All of these profiles 
of men were singular, without it being said that they ex-
ceeded normality. It was with the French Revolution and 
immediately after it, through Pinel, Esquirol and their fol-
lowers in France and elsewhere, that the modern science 
then under construction took upon itself the strange task 
of delimiting, characterising, cataloguing and naming de-
viations. This work has been carried forward ceaselessly 
to this day, with continuity, certainly, but always assaying 
new criteria, arguments and methods. 
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Various schools of pathological psychology have offered 
definitions and traced the limits of many forms of devia-
tion. It is interesting to observe that a definition of normal-
ity and normal has never been provided. Both psychiatry 
and the law have confined themselves to characterising 
anomalies and transgressions and indicating the red line, 
the forbidden threshold beyond which deviant behaviour 
would warrant treatment, to be prescribed by doctors, or 
punishment, to be imposed by magistrates, but without de-
fining the features of the permitted and the appropriate, 
attentive rather to infringement. Thus the gaze that spots 
deviancy is directed from within the ideal space of culture 
towards its margins. 
What then is abnormal? How is it to be understood? How 
are we to deal with it? – King Oedipus, when the quest 
for truth on which he impiously set out finally reached its 
conclusions, recognised that his behaviour was unsustain-
able, not to be looked upon. For that reason, he sought in 
blindness a way of fleeing the disaster that had befallen 
him, of which he himself had been author and victim. Jo-
casta, his wife and his mother, having herself decided not 
to see, had already committed suicide (in Oedipus Rex, 
not in The Phoenician Women; i.e. in Sophocles, but not 
in Euripides) when Creon, the new king, and the choir, 
the people of Thebes, told Oedipus what the god Apollo, 
speaking through Tiresias, had announced: that there was 
no salvation for him in the city, and that the city would 
have no salvation in his presence. That is why Oedipus 
went into exile and, guided by his daughters, began his 
wanderings through the lands of Greece. The oracle had 
named the transgression; ostracism punished the abnor-
mal, monstrous aspect of the offence. 
And ultimately the universality of the Oedipus myth proves 
its ‘normality’, how it belongs intrinsically to man and to 
the plenitude of the human condition. Had not the Greek 
gods committed similar crimes from the start, receiving in 
exchange, instead of punishment, mastery over the world? 
The episode in the Theogony that narrates the birth of the 
first gods, children of Sky and Earth, themselves far from 
human in appearance, deformed and fearful, tells how Kro-
nos, the youngest, in the exasperated tedium of seeing the 
primal scene repeated every twilight, “hated his lusty sire” 
(line 138). His mother armed him with a sickle “And Heav-
en came, bringing on night and longing for love, and he lay 
about Earth spreading himself full upon her. Then the son 
from his ambush stretched forth his left hand and in his 
right took the great long sickle with the jagged teeth, and 
swiftly lopped off his own father’s members and cast them 
away to fall behind him” (lines 176-182). 2
Moreover, outside Greece, the myth is repeated in an 
unlimited number of variations, even as far away as the 
antipodes and New Zealand, where it figures in the my-
thology of the Maori. Because the texture of myths is lay-
ered and successive versions are formed that unfold like 
the leaves of a book, telling different stories on the same 
theme via an inexhaustible recombination of mythemes, 
which are the building blocks of myth-making. A labour 
at once repetitive and inventive, of which Claude Lévi-
Strauss wrote: “If the content of myth is entirely contin-
gent, how is it that, from one end of the Earth to the other, 
myths resemble each other to such an extent?” 3
Certainly there is no one true mythic version: all ver-
sions belong to the myth, all fit into it and contribute to its 
many-leaved texture. This is the case also with the myth 
of Oedipus, of which Freud, according to the great anthro-
pologist, would represent one leaf among others, a constit-
uent version of the universal myth, in proposing the root 
of the conflict necessary in order for “the individual myth 
of which a neurosis consists to be born”. 3
Thus we perceive that the vague borderline, fluctuating 
with the times, with places and latitudes, that is supposed 
to separate the normal from the pathological and divide 
the waters, this chalk line traced on the ground we tread, 
which has the function of separating the permissible from 
the forbidden, is also a mere social construction, an illu-
sion that moves at the whim of the currents of history, the 
prodigious variation of cultures, the drift of ideas, ideolo-
gies and religious belief, the volubility of oral literatures, 
the recombinant play of mythemes. 
Let us consider the case of homosexuality. Over the course 
of my long life I have witnessed a series of metamorpho-
ses in the way in which it has been assessed, framed and 
as it were validated by the prevailing modes of thinking: 
aberration, perversion, disease, inversion, deviancy and, 
lastly, variant of ordinary sexuality, accepted by the spirit 
of the times and called normal. What was held to be a pa-
thology and a scandal has been subsumed little by little 
into the space of normality (in the northern hemisphere, 
or rather in Europe, in a part of Europe that has benefited 
from the ideals of the Enlightenment: for in other latitudes 
and longitudes, tyrannised by Laestrygonians and Cyclo-
pes, a homosexual can be persecuted and condemned to 
death, as we know from reading the newspapers).
And what to think of the taking of drugs and the consump-
tion of psychoactive substances? In today’s liberal society, 
the consumer of drugs either hides and denies his depend-
ency or falls to the bottom of the social ladder. The same 
Enlightenment values are ultimately incompatible with the 
alteration of consciousness that such substances entail, with 
the ‘dionysiac’ component, the distortion of reason and crit-
ical judgement, the behavioural disinhibition and the fo-
ment of non-conforming ideas that they bring about. 
However, in shamanic societies – which, let us not forget, 
had been practising humanity’s first religion since prehis-
toric times 4 – the drug-taker in his trance is situated at the 
zenith of society. He has the highest status, which stems 
from his gift, denied to others, to rise (or descend) to the 
world of the gods, to go among them and swap ideas, re-
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turning to the group to which he belongs in possession of 
new mythogenic materials. Lévi-Strauss again: one day he 
took along to his seminar on ‘identity’ a faiseur de mythes 
who reviewed the initiatory voyage and its beneficial con-
sequences in front of his astonished listeners.
Thus we can clearly see that the boundaries between the 
normal and not normal are imprecise, vague; not just those 
between the Greeks and the barbarians, but between soci-
eties of the present time, the borderline arising from the 
domain of beliefs and the relativity of values. And to ad-
vance to the ultimate consequences of this problematic 
and this question – who is normal, who is pathological 
– let us return to the question, always current and always 
open, posed by Kant: “What is man?” For my part, faced 
with this problem and having taught psychopathology and 
human evolution, that is to say, phenomenological anthro-
pology and biological anthropology, for a long time I had 
no convincing, reasoned answer. 
In truth I am still unable to define this concept and this sin-
gular entity, man, either on the basis of bipedalism, or the 
existence of material culture, or the evidence of symbolic 
contents, or even the development of articulate verbal lan-
guage – which undoubtedly evolved through overlapping 
levels and was guided by natural selection, perhaps begin-
ning with the development of tools, which in my view con-
tain an immanent grammatical and syntactic function. 5
As with the transition between normal and pathological, 
so the boundary between human and non-human strikes 
me as hazy and undecidable, all the more so the further 
research advances on various fronts (paleoanthropology, 
primatology, genetics, behavioural ecology, neuroscience, 
theories of language). Thus, after considering the problem 
from different angles, I opted for a single definition that 
seemed satisfactory to me, and which is a pessimistic defi-
nition: man, the only primate whose behaviour is guided 
by preconceptions. As soon as the primacy of preconcep-
tions (myth, religion, ideology, fashion) is established, we 
are in the domain of the human. 
In the heroic days of psychiatry, in the late 60s and ear-
ly 70s, during my internship in a civil psychiatric hos-
pital, I had the opportunity to observe the inhabitants of 
an asylum ward. My first thought, which I subsequently 
abandoned, was to study them using an etiological meth-
odology, which at the time seemed to me an effective 
weapon, an original method whose origin was distinct 
from the human sciences, it being designed rather to study 
man in his evolving matrix. I abandoned this approach 
for ethical reasons and on account of a certain nausea that 
overcame me when I was preparing to observe some of 
my fellow creatures in a state of profound degradation. 
Those wards were filled with the profoundly mentally re-
tarded, incapable of speech, people with no name but a 
code number, and psychotics who had deteriorated to the 
final dissolution of language, genuinely close to chaos.
On the basis of multidisciplinary study of the genus Homo 
and its pre-human and non-human ancestors (known col-
lectively as hominins), paleoanthropology – a preeminent 
paradigm of interdisciplinary crossover work – enables 
us to assess at each moment of scientific advancement in 
which direction this heuristic provocation, the question 
of borders, opens up. Who is human? And, being human, 
who is normal? 
Returning to the history of humanity and its field of ex-
cellence, which is the history of ideas, it becomes clear to 
us that there are decisive forms of inner experience that, 
while contributing to what we are, are far from normality. 
Let us think of Archimedes and the phenomenon of buoy-
ancy, whose nature he explained; of Copernicus, when he 
conceived of the basis of heliocentric theory and turned 
reasoning on its head to triumph; of Newton, mapping out 
the general law of gravity; and of Descartes, perceiving 
the ontological value of the cogito. We intuit as evident 
that these dazzling moments of inner experience, decisive 
for what would come to be western science and its vision 
of the universe, occurred far from the normal paradigm.
Perhaps any philosophical attitude, that is to say, of sur-
prise at one’s presence somewhere, transgresses the norms 
of what it is to be, to act and to appear normal. That is real-
ly our drama in the world, in the uneasy position in which 
we find ourselves, believing ourselves free and striving to 
free ourselves, being born without deciding to and dying 
without wanting to (or wanting to, but in a limit situation 
of despair).
Meanwhile, there are crazy variations of existence that re-
veal to normal individuals certain experiences and hori-
zons on the world that, if not seen through the eyes of 
delirium, would remain concealed. Paule Thévenin, the 
young doctor to whom Antonin Artaud, shortly before his 
death, entrusted his unpublished manuscripts, leaving her 
a captive of that decision, wrote: “Artaud’s eruption into 
my life: I found myself before a man who revealed to me 
a world crackling with unexplored realities, a thousand 
leagues from the trivial world through which we vegetate. 
It was a universe that was his alone, and with him each 
second assumed density, the least gesture acquired effi-
cacy and sense”. 6
How can we doubt that there is a mythical dimension to 
madness? As if myth as exemplary narrative could be 
built with the disproportionate and extreme materials of 
the being-in-the-world of psychotics. That is why myths 
seem so family to us in their content and so strange in their 
form. And reciprocally: the lived experiences of madness 
are obtained with ingredients very close to the materials 
of myth, and it is the intrusion into space of awareness of 
those incoherent, excessive elements, in contrast with the 
ordering of the real by rationality, that triggers the patho-
logical and brings it onto the clinical stage, accentuating 
the contrast with normality. 
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Moreover, in remission, the psychotic patient restored to 
a certain critical insight becomes aware of the pathologi-
cal condition from which he suffers. And states of passage 
can be felt by the ego that experiences them with a tonal-
ity of the approaching abyss. Thus it is with the famous 
‘schizophrenic trema’, or ‘stage fright’ that heralds diffuse 
delusional mood; with episodes of catatonia, rare these 
days; with Goldstein’s ‘catastrophic reaction’, which re-
fers to the sinking feeling on entering dementia; and, at the 
level of normal physiology, with the brief hypnagogic or 
hypnopompic states (Hermes Psychopompos was the god 
of dreams) that sometimes accompany the dissolution of 
consciousness on falling sleep and that may contain hal-
lucinations, changes in perception of the body, space and 
time, a disturbing sensation of metamorphosis. 
The most singular thing, the most unexpected, is that each 
of us contains in himself, in the latency of his possibilities, 
capacity for the abnormal. – Qui vit sans folie n’est pas 
si sage qu’il croit (“He who lives without folly is not as 
wise as he thinks”) – says La Rochefoucauld’s 209th mor-
al maxim. 7 It is like a last, dangerous trump, that we keep 
back, but that at the limit we can play, just as we repress a 
painful idea without managing to cancel it out. That pos-
sibility hovers over us, observes us, spies on us, worries 
us and sometimes manages to seduce us. Such is our abil-
ity to mistrust when appearances at last invite us to trust; 
thus also the latent seed of jealousy; and the sombre gaze 
of melancholy, which contains deep down the seduction 
of suicide. And there are other possibilities for living with 
the world and with ourselves that present themselves to 
us as undesirable forces – exaltation, belittlement, ecstasy, 
dereliction, introspection.
In terms of abnormality, we have nosos, morbus and pa-
thos, which give different dimensions of deviation; and we 
must set against nosological entities with a natural history 
and a syndromal spectrum those syndromes that are non-
specific and reproduce, as it were amplified and deformed, 
“basic psychological structures”. The latter delineate each 
human being’s mask of psychology and character, the pre-
dominant traits of personality (let us not forget that per-
sona means mask, a character being played in the Roman 
theatre), and take on their own pregnant forms of being 
in the world, and of being with oneself. They define the 
predominant mode in which each person lives and acts; 
they show the normal profile of that which, increased dis-
proportionately, will lead to the typical syndromes of psy-
chopathology. 
Underlying this set of possibilities are “general forms of 
reaction”, true atoms of human response to the world’s 
demands, such as feeling happy, feeling sad, yearning, ob-
sessing somatising, being stricken with panic, becoming 
exasperated, distrusting, being jealous, despairing, etc., 
which exist in a limited number (no more than thirty) and 
permit the combinatorics for each and every human atti-
tude expressed by the experience-behaviour binomial, like 
the elements of Mendeleev’s periodical table which, com-
bining with each other in countless ways, have produced 
all the variations in the universe.
These generally invisible, but not inactive, reaction mod-
ules, are like dormant munitions at the base of human ex-
perience that at all times have the capacity to actualise and 
burst into action. At that point they will break the equilib-
rium and arise disproportionately, manifesting abnormal-
ity. This is how the insurrection of madness is sheltered 
within us, as something not current, peripheral, at first 
sight derisory – and yet, without it, we would not be us. 
In us also, therefore, there hides the boundary between the 
normality assumed and the pathology denied, an uncer-
tain, shifting and precarious line. 
And since I began by talking about monsters, a few more 
words about the body will not be out of place. We are situ-
ated in a risky, asymmetrical position in space and time, and 
we move in accordance with four key references, the spa-
tial, temporal, corporeal and cosmic systems. We effective-
ly condemn ourselves to inhabit our body, to live with it, to 
question it, to scrutinise it – sometimes as an accomplice to 
our thinking and feeling, sometimes as a fate that has been 
loaned to us, but belongs to the other side of things. 
The world fragment that comes to us in the form of body, 
with which, within which we grow, that we carry and 
which carries us through life, never ceases to intrigue us, if 
we interrogate it. Our sensorium and our sensibility dwell 
in it; our will guides it; our plans, ambitions, desires and 
fears move it. It seems at our service, it accompanies us 
from infancy to death, from the obscure times of the one to 
the unforeseeable moment of the other. Yet it surprises us 
with the strange reasons of its complicity, which is the ve-
hicle of our attitude in the world. Do we know it thorough-
ly, the body? Far from it. Its external outline, the imagined 
picture of organs and functions, the movements that ani-
mate gestures, stances and mimicry and bring emotion to 
discourse and reason, all these planes of the relationship 
with the body are fairly obscure and strange to us. 
If we look at our reflection in the mirror, if we prolong 
that gaze, if we probe the image of our eyes, suddenly we 
find ourselves facing a stranger, a threatening being that 
is alien to us and cloaks itself in otherness, that sends us 
a signal of strangeness – and that strangeness, which can 
cause fear or tedium, is what Sartre called nausea, the true 
heroine of his famous novel La nausée. There is the mon-
ster, made in our own image. If we see ourselves on film? 
We are astonished at our gestures. If we hear a recording 
of our voice? We can’t believe that that is how others hear 
us. We look at old photographs? We are amazed at our ap-
pearance. To the body that limits us (in the dual sense of 
the word) and translates us, and also to the spoken or writ-
ten word that it permits, we think we entrust our freedom. 
And we perceive that this is a misunderstanding.
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In psychopathology, various continents loom that ex-
press different degrees of abnormality and disproportion. 
In neurosis, we find consequences of man’s conflict with 
himself; in psychopathy, effects of his conflict with the 
world; in psychosis, an insurgency of thought and feeling 
against a certain tyranny of logic and the logos. And like 
the Greeks who set a course from the centre for the periph-
ery of the world, by way of these continents of psychic pa-
thology also we encounter increasingly altered landscapes 
and monsters.
On this point, a comment. One of the historical misunder-
standings of psychiatry stems from the fact that, at the turn 
of the 20th century, two exact contemporaries who were 
working not far away from each other, one in Vienna, the 
other in Munich – Freud and Kraepelin – constructed over-
arching models of psychiatric pathology: the former sine 
materia and inspired by hysteria; the other with a basis in in-
jury, founded on the example of general paresis in syphilis. 
Both models built on a broad clinical foundation, persua-
sive, internally coherent, but omnipotent and incommensu-
rable, forming opposite poles of psychiatric knowledge. 
While the modules of madness are gathered within us like 
a collection of ungerminated seeds, the experience of liv-
ing with the other, with a crazy who has taken leave of 
reality, can be disturbing. I will recount a fragment of 
memory shared with several colleagues from my medical 
studies, who have on occasion recalled to me a class with 
Barahona Fernandes that I too remember, when we were 
in the 6th year at the Faculty of Medicine and we attended 
the chair of psychiatry, in the faraway year of 1963. There 
were almost no psychoactive drugs. The professor had in-
vited us to one of the wards at Hospital Júlio de Matos 
whose gloomy, uncomfortable appearance, tucked away 
in a corner of that labyrinth, already created an inhospita-
ble atmosphere. 
Over the course of the lecture, at his signals, the head 
nurse brought into the session, one after the other, a de-
teriorated schizophrenic patient, with stereotypies and in 
an intense hallucinatory state; a manic patient, with flight 
of ideas and hypermetamorphotic behaviour; and a pro-
foundly mentally retarded patient, incapable of speech, 
emitting inarticulate vocalisations. In his expert way, 
Barahona was able, alternately, now to establish a certain 
empathy with these patients (who seemed to us incapable 
of any understanding or dialogue), now to turn to us – to 
the fraction of the medical course that had managed to get 
there – and teach us to recognise those syndromes and dis-
eases, illustrating the being-in-the-world of patients with 
the behaviour that we were able to observe in them. 
It was as if we had travelled to the lost lands of the Laes-
trygonians and the Lotophagi. For all of us it represented 
an experience of otherness, a confrontation between what 
we thought to be normality, in its beliefs and rules, and 
the most radical pathology, definitively at odds with the 
norm. Some fifteen years later, when I was assistant to 
the chair of psychiatry (still in the years of the intellectual 
turbulence that followed the 25th of April, and that was 
salutary), a number of ‘antipsychiatrists’ came to Lisbon 
– David Cooper, Ronald Laing, Franco Basaglia. And one 
afternoon, when I told Barahona Fernandes that I was go-
ing to attend a conference by the famous Thomas Szasz, 
he answered only: “Say anything you like to him, except 
that there is no such thing as mental illness, because you 
have already seen that there is.” 
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